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7905B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALEM CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs 
BRUCE FARNSUORTH, 
Defendant -Respondent , 
Case No, 87-0347-CA 
DRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURSIDICTION 
This i s an appeal from a Judgement of D i s m i s s a l by the 
C i r c u i t Court of Utah County, Spanish Fork Department, in a 
c r i m i n a l c a s e , a l l e g i n g a v i o l a t i o n of Salem C i t y ' s Zoning 
Ordinance
 9 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Salem C i t y sought to p r o s e c u t e Defendant Farnsworth for 
a Zoning Ordinance v i o l a t i o n , Occupying a Mobile home in a 
R e s i d e n t i a l Zone, He was found not g u i l t y by the C i r c u i t Court , 
from which f i n d i n g , t h e C i t y a p p e a l e d . 
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES & STATUTES 
1 , Salem City Ordinances 2-8 and 3-17; 
2 . Chapter 57 -16 UCA, Mobile Home Park Res idency 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant bought a 3 .42 a c r e l o t in Utah County in 
1 9 7 8 , t h e l o t a d j o i n e d S a l e m f s c i t y l i m i t s . On the l o t was an 
o ld home, which was u n i n h a b i t a b l e and he moved a mobile horn* 
2 
onto the lot in January of 1985f see exhibit $1. The County 
taxed him for both the mobile home and the old home, see Exhibit 
#2. He applied for annexation into Salem in July of 1984 see 
Exhibit #3, which process was completed in January 1985, the 
annexed property was zoned Residential and later the rear 
portion of the lot was rezoned Commercial to accommodate his 
contracting business. He simultaneously with annexation applied 
for a building permit to refurbish the old home, which the City 
granted, on condition that he pay sewer and water hookup fees 
for both the mobile home and house, See Exhibit #3. 
The mobile home had been removed from it's wheels, was 
mounted on a permanent foundation, with permanent connections to 
utilities. On the 17th of September, 1986, the parties entered 
into an agreement, copy attached as Exhibit #4, which defendant 
considered a settlement agreement acknowledging the legality of 
both buildings on his property. He complied with the time 
schedule on the agreement, moved out of the mobile home and into 
the refurbished home in December 1986. On or about the 15th of 
December, 1986 the mobile home sustained a fire, which destroyed 
it's usability as a residence. He elected to buy the shell back 
from his insurance company, for use as a storage building in 
connection with his construction business; it never has been 
used as a residence since the fire.(See Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, and Affidavit, Exhibit #5). 
In April of 1987, a summons was served on Defendant, 
charging Improper location of a Mobile Home, see Exhibit #6. A 
copy of the Information is attached as Exhibit #7. In response, 
the defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit #5, which the 
Circuit Court granted in it's Ruling, Exhibit #8. 
3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1 . By Defini t ion f the defendant 's building is not a 
portable dwelling unit (Salem Ordinance 2-8) 
2 . The bui lding i s not an Occupied t r a i l e r house or 
mobile home as prohibi ted by Salem Ordinance 3-17. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S BUILDING IS NOT A 
PORTABLE DWELLING UNIT 
1. Plaintiff Salem City charges in it's Information, 
Exhibit #7, the the Defendant "committed the crime of Permitting 
a Trailer house or Mobile Home to be located in an Improper 
Zone", in violation of Section 3-17 of the City ordinances. The 
ordinance is reproduced in Respondent's Brief as an Addendum. 
The definition of what constitutes a Mobile Home is reproduced 
as 2-8 of the City Ordinances, in the same Addendum. The 
pertinent language from 2-8 is: 
Mobile home shall mean a dwelling unit...designed to 
be transported after fabrication on it's own wheels or 
detachable wheels and which is- ready for occupancy as 
an independant dwelling unit except for connection to 
utilities and/or location on as foundation. 
Patently the description does not fit, because, (1) it 
is no longer a "Dwelling"
 f (2) it is connected to the 
utilities, and (3) is located on a permanent foundation. Any one 
of these conditions would put it outside the statutory 
definition; all three of the described differences certainly put 
defendant beyond the pale of criminal offence. 
4 
POINT II 
THE MOBILE HOME IS NOT 
AN OCCUPIED RESIDENTIAL UNIT 
1. The parties, through counsel, stipulated at pretrial 
of the matter, that there were no factual issues to be resolved, 
the plaintiff accepted all the facts set forth in Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, along with the Affidavit of the Defendant as 
true, for purposes of permitting the judge to rule on the matter 
without trial• 
2. The Defendant acquiesed in the language of the city 
ordiance, 3-17 and 2-8 as being the requirements of the city, 
but denied that he was guilty of violating the ordinance, 
because he was not occupying the trailer, and because its use 
was necessarily modified by the fire which destroyed its 
usability for human habitation. 
3. Plaintiff relies for his statutory construction on a 
series of cases, all dealing with undeveloped land. It is 
respectfully submitted that those cases are not material to this 
case, because the idea of being in possession or occupation of 
agricultural property (as in Twiggs v. Land Commissioners 27 Ut 
245, 75 Pac. 729) is a far different thing than occupying ( or 
not occupying, a mobile home*} As pointed out in the affidavit 
of Defendant (Exhibit |5, it is a common thing for people to 
store a mobile home or house trailer next to their homes, even 
the building inspector has one). it obviously was not the 
intent of the drafters of the city*s ordinances to prohibit such 
storage, it was only th^ir intent to prohibit such portable 
housing from being used for residential purposes, i.e. as a 
dwelling unit. 
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4* The modifying language of the Ordinance 3-17, 
indicates that such mobile homes and house trailers are allowed 
in licensed courts* This leads us to the language of 57-16 UCA, 
the Mobile Home Park Residency statute, which defines the term 
"Mobile Home", as meaning: 
"a transportable structure in one or more sections 
with the plumbing, heating, and electrical systems 
contained within the unit, which when erected on a 
site, may be used with or without a permanent 
foundation as a family dwelling." 
That statute also defines "Mobile Home Park" as: 
"any tract of land on which two or more mobile home 
spaces are leased, or offered for lease or rent, to 
accommodate mobile homes for residential purposes." 
5. Obviously, the concept of storage of such structures 
or their use for the purpose of storing materials, is not 
anticipated as being within the purvue of that statute, no more 
should it be anticipated in Salem's ordinance, which by its own 
terms anticipate "occupancy" as being in connection with 
residential occupancy, and as a dwelling unit. 
6. The rule with respect to interpretation of specific 
terms, is well addressed in the similar case of Padjen vs. 
Shipley 553 P2d 938 (Utah 1976), a case where defendant was 
accused of violating a zoning ordinance by keeping a dog in a 
fenced in run within ~4U feet of a street. The ordinance used 
the term "Pen" which plaintiff insisted applied to a dog kennel. 
The court pointed out that "Pen" is more likely associated with 
pigs than dogs, and that the terms "keeping" or "maintaining" 
likewise were ambiguous, since household pets were allowed in 
the zone. The court referred to the rule of Statutory 
Construction used in Heathman v. Giles, 374 P2d 839, noscitur a 
sociis, literally "it is known from its associates". 
6 
As a p p l i e d to the case a t b a r , the word "occupy" i s 
used in connec t ion with t h e terms " r e s i d e n c e " and "dwel l ing 
u n i t " , and a d v i s e d l y s o , because t h e r e i s obvious ly no i n t e n t in 
t h e ord inance to p reven t unoccupied mobile homes or house 
t r a i l e r s from being s t o r e d in t h e zone . 
7 . S i m i l a r l y , in t h e case of C r i s t v . Bishop 520 P2d 
196, (Utah 1974) , our Supreme Court s t r u g g l e d with the 
d e f i n i t i o n of t h e term " s c h o o l " , and concluded t h a t t he term i s 
a g e n e r i c one, with many meanings, and t h a t the contex t and 
purpose of t h e s t a t u t e must be r e f e r r e d to in order to determine 
t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . 
CONCLUSION: 
The C i r c u i t Court c o r r e c t l y d i smissed the c r imina l case 
f i l e d a g a i n s t Defendant , because he i s not "occupying" h i s 
mobile home in v i o l a t i o n of the R e s i d e n t i a l Zoning t h a t 
a p p l i e s . The s t r u c t u r e has been conver ted to a s t o r age shed , 
which i s an al lowed use in t h e r e s i d e n t i a l zone , and so long as 
t h e s t r u c t u r e i s not occupied for purposes of a r e s i d e n t i a l 
dwel l ing u n i t , defendant i s not v i o l a t i n g the Ordinance . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , t h i s 2n<^ day of December, 1987
- /7/Z^ 
( /sien J. (&£lis, for Respondent 
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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
This Memorandum of Understanding made this /~7 day of 
September, 1986 by and between SALEM CITY, a Municipal Corporation of 
the State of Utah, "SALEM" hereafter, and BRUCE FARNSWORTH, of Salem, 
Utah, "FARNSWORTH" hereafter 
RECITALS 
t . The parties hereto recognize that Farnsworth presently has 
located a mobile home at 245 East 400 North in Salem. 
2. 
(. The parties further acknowled ^7^2 
3. ""The parties further acknowledge^ that hepAtofore Saj^m 
consented to annex the property where saidrhobi le home is located into 
the City of Salem on condition that Farnsworth complete the remodel of a 
frame home located on said premises and that said remodelling be 
completed by July 1986. 
4. The parties further recognize that the remodelling was not 
completed within the time agreed upon. 
5. The parties further acknowledge that Farnsworth has agreed 
to proceed with remodelling the said home with diligence to the end that 
the same will be remodelled and liveable as a residence on or before 
December 1, 1986. 
IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual covenants herein set forth it 
i s agreed as follows: 
1, Salem agrees to defer enforcement procedures for zone 
- 1 -
violation by reason of the location of the mobile home as hereinabove 
described until December l f 1986. 
2. Farnsworth agrees to undertake promptly the remodelling of 
the frame home on the premises above described and to have the same 
completely remodelled and suitable for human habitation by December l f 
1986. 
3« In the event the remodelling as above specified is not 
completed by December 1, 1986, Salem shall have the right to forthwith 
terminate al l water and electrical service to the entire premises wherein 
said mobile home i s located. 
4. In the event services are terminated as herein recited, 
Farnsworth acknowledges that he has no recourse, legal or otherwise, 
for such termination pursuant hereto. 
DATED this / / ^ d a y of September, 1986. 
SALEM CITY: 
ATTEST: 
WITNESS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH J 
ss. 
z^QUCt *7&inM£#€^ 
TJROCE FARNSWORTH 
0 n t h e
 I*?-1 d a y o f September, 1986, personally appeared before 
me ALLEN D. WOODHOUSE, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he, 
the said ALLEN D. WOODHOUSE, is the Mayor of Salem City, a Municipal 
Corporation, and that the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of 
said Corporation by authority of a resolution of the City Council, and 
the said ALLEN D. WOODHOUSE duly acknowledged to me that said 
Corporation executed the same. 
My commission expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
NOfARY PUBLlg>> i ;.• ^ j ^ 
Residing: jQtUyfrv ^^A^'^ 0.-&S 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
On the 
) 
V. 
day of September, 1986, personally appeared before 
me BRUCE FARNSWORTH, signer of the foregoing and acknowledged to me 
that he executed the same. 
My commission expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing: 
- 3 -
1 
2 
31 41 
51 61 
7 81 
91 
10 
11 
12 
13 
141 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20| 
21 
221 
23 
241 
25 
26 
27 
28 
GLEN J. ELLIS, #1514 
DEAN B. ELLIS, #4976 
Attorney's for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 377-1097 
7Q64B 1311A 
IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPT. 
SALEM CITY, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
BRUCE FARNSWQRTH, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMa oo 
Criminal No. 87 CR 202 
Comes now the defendant, and moves the court to dismiss 
the above case, for the reason and on the grounds that the 
ordinance which plaintiff claims defendant violated has no 
application to defendant, because the trailer's use has been 
converted from residential occupancy to use as a storage 
building, as particularly set forth in the affidavit attached. 
Dated this 26th of May, 1987. 
for Defendant. 
NOTICE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion, with Affidavit 
and Memorandum attached to Richard M. & James R. Taylor/ 
attorneys for Plaintiff, Box 288, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660-0288, 
postage prepaid, this 26th of May, 1987, 
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GLEN J. ELLIS, #1514 
DEAN B. ELLIS, #4976 
Attorney's for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 377-1097 
7065B 1311A 
IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPT. 
SALEM CITY, 
vs 
Plaintiff 
BRUCE FARNSWORTH, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Criminal No. 87 CR 202 
At the time of pretrial, it was agreed between counsel 
and the court that this is -a matter which can be resolved bv 
Motion to Dismiss, and counsel was given 10 days to file the 
motion, the City to respond within 10 days thereafter, 
The undersigned has filed a motion, to which is 
attached the Affidavit of the Defendant. It is his position 
that he has cooperated with the city in every way since he had 
been in business in Salem, starting in 1978. He obtained a 
building permit to remodel the home on the lot, paid for twcj 
sewer hookups and two water hookups, lived in the trailer during 
the remodeling, and when they insisted that he move out of tha 
trailer, he moved into the remodeled home, leaving the trailed 
vacant. 
81 
11 
1 
21 
3 
j The Defendant feels that he has converted the trailer 
from a residence to that of a storage building. The trailer has 
been without wheels for 2 years, and is permanently established 
6 on a cement block foundation. It meets all code requirements 
7 for such a building, and is not an "occupied building" in terms 
of Sec. 3-17 of the Salem City Codel 
As set forth in the defendants Affidavit, many trailers 
911 are stored around the city, including one at the home of the 
JQ Building Inspector, there is no prohibition against having a 
trailer on your premises, but only against occupying it. I 
believe the sense of the ordinance is to allow a trailer to be 
121] stored, but not lived in as a residence. 
23 The ordinance allows storage buildings. The mere fact 
that this one was once a mobile home, does not make it any 
different than the other storage building on the premises. We 
1511 respectfully submit that the change of use makes the ordinance 
jg inapplicable to this circumstance. 
Respectfully, 
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GLEN J. ELLIS, #1514 
DEAN B. ELLIS, #4976 
Attorney's for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 377-1097 
7064B 1311A 
IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPT. 
SALEM CITY, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Criminal Ho. 87 CR 202 
BRUCE FARNSWORTH, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
The undersigned, Bruce Farnsworth, being duly sworn, 
deposes as follows: 
1. That I am the defendant above named, and am the 
owner of a Mobile Home, a copy of the Purchase Agreement is 
attached as exhibit #1, by this reference made a part hereof. 
2. I am the buyer under a contract with Ralph A. and 
Joyce Henderson of a real property at 245 E 400 N in Salem, 
which is more fully described in the tax notice for 1986, copy 
attached as Exhibit #2. The trailer described in Exhibit #1 is 
shown on the tax notice as having a value for tax purposes of 
$7897. The trailer has been shown on the tax roles for the last 
two years, since it was removed from its wheels, and mounted 
permanently on a cement block foundation. 
3. I received a notice from the plaintiff in the latter 
part of 1986 to move the trailer, but elected to cease using it 
51 
6 
91 
12 
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as a residence, and in December of 1986 I moved my family into 
4II the refurbished home on the same property# and vacated the 
mobile home. The mobile home has since that time not been used 
for anything, and I anticipate in the future it will be used 
only as a storage shed in connection with the excavation 
7|| business I carry on on the premises* 
o|| 4. The property above has been commercial since I first 
moved there in 1978. The approximately 50 feet of the lot 
closest to the street known as 400 North has been in the city 
10 for many years, and was as far as I know, always has been zoned 
jj commercial. When I * had the back part of the lot annexed, it 
came into the city as Residential, and was later changed to 
Commercial. 
1311 5. I had a survey plat prepared, a copy of the bill 
jj attached as Exhibit #3, shows that the date was July 6, 1984. 
It took a long time to get the annexation complete. When the 
City finally got me annexed, they required me to have two 
16 separate sewer connections and two separate water connections, a 
j7 copy of the City receipt is also found on Exhibit #3. One of 
each kind of connection was for the trailer, the other was for 
the home. 
19|| 6. On or about the 15th of December, 1986, the mobile 
20 home was damaged by fire, the insurance company declared it ^ 
total loss, and paid me the full value of the home. I later 
elected to buy the damaged mobile home back, ta use ~it as a 
22 storage shed. Since that time, it has not been used at all, and 
23 will in the future be used only for storage. 
7. I have another storage shed on the premises, about 
which the plaintiff has never made xromplaint. 1 believe storage 
25 sheds are an allowed use in the zone. The building inspector 
26 has a mobile home by his home, and there are many aluminum sheds 
„ all over the city. 
27 
Dated this 26th of Hay, 1987. 
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Bruce Farnsworth 
Sworn to before me, a notary, the day above written, 
Bruce Farnsworth. 
My Com. Exp: 9/27/88 
Cy< / 
/ — r — — y / **-'*"—— 
/ Notary/ Provo, Utah 
^ < = 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
JJEAH COUNTY. SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
SALEM CITY, 
Plaint i f f 
vs 
BFUCE FAFNSWORTH, 
7094 South 3600 West 
Benjamin, UT 84660 
DOB: Unknown 
D e f e n d a n t ( s ) 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT(S) 
An In format ion -has been f i l e d w i t h t h e above Court by 
Salem City 
a l l e g i n g t h a t you committed t h e p u b l i c o f f e n s e o f : 
Improper Location of a Mobile Hare, a Class B misdemeanor 
a t 245 East 400 North, Salem Utah 
on March 25, 1987 
in violation of Salem City Zcnging Ordinance Secticn 3-17 
It appears from said Information (or an_affidavit filed there-
with) that there is probable cause to believe that the alleged offense 
has been committed and that you committed, the ^ arae*^ Therefore* 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to appeair before a. judge ^ ^^he-€4^cuit 
Court at the time^and place shown below* 
DATE: April 15, 1987 TIME: 10:00 A.M. 
PLACE: 40 South Main Street, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
to answer the charge made against you. If you fail to obey this Summons, 
or contact the Clerk of the Court (telephone 798-8674) and arrange for 
your appearance on another date, the Court will issue a warrant for your 
arrest. 
DATED: April 1, 1987 
SUMMONS 
Criminal 
No. 
87 CR 202 
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p C\et\ tUXS*, ^ ^ tcM^cut RICHARD M. TAYLOR 3207 
TAYLOR & TAYLOR 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
rt% NOKTM M A I N STUCST 
I». a. BOX am 
SPANISH rORJC UTAH B4660 -03BS 
(aoi) 7 M - M 9 4 
Attorney! for P l a i n t i f f 
IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
* * * * * * * * * * 
SALEM CITY, 
Plaintiff, INFORMATION 
vs. 
BRUCE FARNSWORTH, 
7094 South 3600 West 
Benjamin, Utah 84660 
D.O.B. Not Known/Adult 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Civil No. 
The undersigned complainant states on information and 
belief that the defendant committed the crime of Permitting a 
Trailer House or Mobile Home to be Located in an Improper-
Zone, to-wits 
[MPROPER LOCATION OF & MOBILE HOME? *F Class B 
Misdemeanor he violation of Salem City Zoning Ordinrarrce 
Section 3-13> oa-or-about March -25, 1987, and continuing at 
245 East 400 North, Salem, Utah, in that the Defendant did 
o o 
ID 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
I I , 16 
* J 17 
18 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
occupy a t r a i l e r house or mobile home upon h i s property in 
violation of Salem City Zoning Ordinance, 
DATED t h i s day of March, 1987. 
COMPLAINANT 
Subscr ibed and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s 
March, 1987. 
day of 
JUDGE 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
SALEM CHY 
VS 
BRUCE FARNSWORTH' 
Plaintiff 
¥^7 
Defendant 
R U L I N G 
CASE NO. 87 CR-202 
This matter came before the Court for Pretrial Conference on the 26th 
day of May# 1987. It was agreed between the parties that the only issue 
remaining was a question and the case was submitted to the Court by memor-
anda in lieu of trial. 
After considering the memoranda of counsel
 # it appears that the case 
must turn on the definition of the term "occupied trailer house". Ihe 
stipulated facts are to the effect that the trailer is no longer lived in 
but is used for storage. The Qrdinanoe itself is not helpful by providing 
a definition. While several possible definitions of "occupy" may be broad 
enough to include jnere possession or storage
 f it appears to the Court that 
the narrowest fair definitions consistent with the purposes of the statute 
is that occupy means "human habitations11. 
Accordingly, the Court finds and so rules that the City has failed *Q 
carry its burden or proof and enters a verdict of acquittal. 
DATED: June 29, 1987 
